By Rachel Shafer  |  Photos By Courtesy Sequoia Voting Systems

Swiss cheese: That’s what the source code for California’s electronic voting machines looks like when it comes to protecting voter security and privacy. The flaws were uncovered by David Wagner, associate professor of electrical engineering and computer sciences, and

a UC-led team that conducted a review ordered last summer by Secretary of State Debra Bowen.

“We looked for anything that could corrupt the software, shut down a polling place or do harm to an election,” says Wagner, a renowned cryptologist and computer security expert who co-led the study with UC Davis professor Matt Bishop. “The flaws we found were pervasive, blatant and mundane.”

That was bad news for manufacturers Diebold Elections Systems, Hart InterCivic and Sequoia Voting Systems, and even worse news for the 43 counties that have sunk millions into the latest polling place technology, hoping to have it ready for use in California’s February 5, 2008, primary. Now counties will limit their use of the machines (polling places must have at least one electronic booth to accommodate disabled voters) and may return to paper ballots in the near term. Manufacturers must make technical improvements as recommended by the study.

 

In the midst of the shakeout, Wagner, who calls himself an electronic voting proponent, stands firm by his conclusions. Charged with reviewing the source code security of the different systems as well as their documentation, he pulled together a team of 25 experts from around the country. The group was given two months to execute various attack scenarios. “The procedures we used are standard in the industry for evaluating security,” Wagner says.

All three machines had similar problems. The biggest was a vulnerability to viruses. “In the worst-case scenario, these malicious codes could be used to compromise the votes recorded on the machines’ memory cards or render the machines nonfunctional on election day,” he says. That’s a fundamental design flaw, Wagner argues, and not correctable with a simple patch.

The team also found scenarios where the secrecy of a ballot could be compromised but concluded that those problems are fixable.

What does this mean for voters? Go with paper ballots if possible over the next couple years, Wagner says, but don’t let an electronic voting machine deter you. The main thing is to vote, period.

After achieving notoriety by hacking into corporate security systems as a student, Wagner now focuses on national security issues and governmental safeguards. He calls the review one of his most rewarding projects.

“This is a landmark study with implications not just for California but other states as well. It’s exciting to do work that can help vendors and officials improve elections and benefit democracy.”